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Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in
Pretext Cases
Catherine J. Lanctot'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc.' was
its seventh attempt in nearly thirty years to establish a rule of law for
circumstantially proving an individual disparate treatment case.' The Court's
inability to provide clear guidance in individual disparate treatment cases, which
I will also call "pretext cases," is particularly troubling because such cases are the
most common ones brought under employment discrimination laws. Each time
the Court has spoken on this question, the lower courts have struggled to make
sense of what it said, developing their own versions of the rule the Court
purported to establish. The variations in the pretext rules may be called "pretext-
plus," "pretext-minus," or even "pretext-maybe." At bottom, however, the
disarray of the lower federal courts that has persisted for more than twenty years
is the product of the Court's refusal to set down a rule of law that would govern
pretext cases.
As a review of the precedent indicates, despite sometimes heated rhetoric in
recent opinions, the Supreme Court has adhered to the same basic model for
circumstantial proof in pretext cases for nearly thirty years. I will further show
that the ongoing confusion in the lower courts over the method of proof has
resulted from the Court's unwillingness to provide a definitive rule of law to be
applied in all pretext cases. The lower courts have been given ample loopholes
through which to limit or expand the scope of pretext cases at will. These
loopholes have generated woeful uncertainty for litigants. The Reeves case fits
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1. 530 U.S. 133, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
2. The Supreme Court's prior forays into this area include, in chronological order: McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 98 S. Ct. 1817 (1973); Fumco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 93 S. Ct. 2943 (1978); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); United States Postal
Service Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S. Ct. 1478 (1983); and St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). The Court had also granted certiorari on the
question of pretext twice between Aikens and Hicks. The parties apparently settled the first case prior
to argument. See Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc. 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc), writ
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052,108 S. Ct. 25 (1987). The Court actuallyheard argument on the second case,
but dismissed the writ six weeks later as improvidently granted. See Brieck v. Harbison-Walker
Refac tories, 624 F. Supp. 363 (W.D. Pa. 1985), opinion amended upon denial of reconsideration, 705
F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Pa. 1986), affd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 822 F.2d 52 (3d Cir.
1987), writ dismissed as improvidently granted, 488 U.S. 226, 109 S. Ct. 546 (1988).
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this pattern neatly, and one can easily anticipate that it is likely to produce the
same results in the lower courts. For this reason, I advocate the development of
a definitive rule in this area. The only way to ensure that the federal
antidiscrimination laws are applied uniformly throughout the country is for the
Court to stop creating loopholes in its pretext opinions, and instead to establish a
fair rule to be applied consistently in pretext cases. In my view, the rule that would
be most fair to plaintiffs and defendants, and which best serves the purposes of
federal law, is a modified version of the pretext-only rule that some courts used
prior to Hicks. Under my version of the pretext-only rule, which I call the "pretext-
always" rule, a plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law by successfully
proving the following: (1) all the elements of the prima facie case, (2) the falsity of
the defendant's proffered explanation, and (3) the falsity of any other explanation
reasonably inferred from the record as a whole.
This rule would make it more difficult for federal judges to interpose their own
misgivings about employment discrimination laws for the judgments of juries. It
also would provide defendants with additional protection against unwarranted
findings of unlawful discrimination. The rule would address directly the judicial
concern about employers being unfairly penalized for giving pretextual reasons that
conceal secret, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. In addition, it would
also remove the incentive for employers to lie about their true motivation. The
pretext-always rule will uphold the national policy of equal treatment in the
workplace as expressed through federal antidiscrimination laws. In short, under the
pretext-always rule, the employer will no longer be able to avoid liability by relying
either on secrets or lies.
II. FROM MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO HICKS
If one examines the teachings of the Court in its seven leading pretext
decisions, one finds that there has been very little change in the basic framework it
established in the landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.' Those
requirements are familiar to us by now: the establishment of the prima facie case,
with a presumption of impermissible discrimination; the rebuttal of that
presumption by submitting, although not proving, a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action; and the proofby a preponderance of the evidence
that the reason advanced was not the true reason, but rather a pretext for
discrimination. The Court has refined this analysis over time, to be sure, and in
recent years has focused particularly on the requirement that the finding at the
pretext stage be a finding of "pretext for discrimination."4 Nevertheless, one could
safely say that there is little difference between the initial model set forth in 1973
by Justice Powell for a unanimous Court in McDonnell Douglas and that reaffirmed
in 2000 by Justice O'Connor for a unanimous Court in Reeves.
3. 411 U.S. 792,93S.Ct. 1817(1973).
4. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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The reason that the Court has had to repeat itself over the last thirty years is
that the lower courts have persisted in establishing different rules of proof for
pretext cases, producing splits among the circuits that the Court has felt compelled
to resolve. The rule of proof that has caused this split is the so-called "pretext-plus"
rule, which I identified in 1991 as prevalent in certain courts of appeals.' Under
that rule, which emerged after the Court's decision in Burdine v. Texas Department
of Community Affairs,6 a plaintiff may not prevail merely by proving pretext at the
third stage of the McDonnell Douglas formulation, but rather must have additional
"plus" evidence to establish that the pretextual reason offered by the defendant
concealed a discriminatory reason, rather than some other unstated reason.7 The
courts that followed this rule, including the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
insisted on some "plus" evidence such as comparative evidence, statistical analysis,
and even direct evidence, without ever precisely quantifying when such evidence
would suffice to prove discrimination.' At times, one could have speculated that
nothing short of an employer confession of liability would meet the high threshold
set by some pretext-plus courts for proving employment discrimination
circumstantially.
The pretext-plus rule was inconsistent with the plain language ofBurdine.9 In
that unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Powell, the Court had said quite
clearly:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.'o
That language appeared to undercut the theory of the pretext-plus courts, which was
that it was inappropriate to infer discrimination without more than just a showing
of pretext.
In 1993, in an attempt to resolve the deepening split among the circuits, the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. " That 5-4
decision has been widely criticized for undermining traditional assumptions about
the prevalence of employment discrimination generally, and for imposing too great
5. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
"Pretext-Plus " Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 Hastings L.J. 57 (199 1)[hereinafter
Lanctot, The Defendent Lies].
6. 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
7. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 81-88.
8. Id. at91-100.
9. See generally, id. at 100-30.
10. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095 (emphasis supplied).
11. 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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a burden on plaintiffs in pretext cases.' 2 In particular, Hicks flatly rejected the
"pretext-only" rule that would mandate entry ofjudgment for a plaintiff who proved
pretext. Justice Scalia's opinion disavowed various portions of the Burdine opinion
that would have supported the "pretext-only" rule, including the passage quoted
above. 3 He insisted that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for
discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that
discrimination was the real reason. 4 Moreover, the extremely vituperative language
used by both Justice Scalia on behalf of the majority and Justice Souter for the four
dissenters suggested that the Justices believed they were resolving a controversial
issue with far-reaching significance. 5 Reading the harsh debate in Hicks over the
proper treatment of "lying defendants," one might easily have concluded that the
Court was about to adopt a pro-employer rule of proof that would permanently alter
the landscape of disparate treatment cases.
A careful reading ofHicks revealed that it had not imposed the pretext-plus rule
as a blanket rule of decision in disparate treatment cases, although much of Justice
Scalia's opinion gave comfort to the courts that had adhered to that rule. If one
hacks through the hyperbole, hypotheticals, repetitions, and occasional insults that
dot the majority opinion, one ultimately uncovers a short passage that seems
strangely inconsistent with the rest of the discussion. In language that soon became
the focus of litigants and the courts, the Hicks majority stated:
The factfmder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination ......
12. Scholarly criticism of Hicks abounds and will not be revisited here. The best-known defense
ofHicks is Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev.
2229(1995). Valuable critiques of Hicks include Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext:
Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate
Treatment, 4 Empl. Rts. & Employ. Pol'y J. 37 (2000); William R. Corbett, OfBabies, Bathwater. and
Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time To Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 Empl. Rts. &
Employ. Pol'y J. 361 (1998); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279 (1997); Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial
Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the
"Personality "Excuse, 18 Berkeley J. Employ. & Lab. L. 183 (1997); Deborah A. Calloway, St.Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 997 (1994).
13. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-17, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751-53 (1993).
Justice Scalia described this language as "dictum [which] contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous
other statements, both in Burdine itself and in our later case law-commencing with the very citation
of authority Burdine uses to support the proposition." Id. at 517, 113 S. Ct. at 2752-53.
14. Id. at 515,113 S. Ct. at 2751.
15. See, e.g., id. at 511 n.4, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 n.4 (describing dissent's "confusion-producing
analysis" and describing dissenting opinion as "alarum"); id. at 530 n.5, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 n.5
(describing majority opinion as "half-hearted") (Souter, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (first emphasis supplied).
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One could be forgiven for reading the quotations from Burdine and Hicks and
concluding that the Court had done nothing but repeat itself. It is undeniable that
the holding ofHicks rejected the mandatory entry ofjudgment for a plaintiff who
successfully proved pretext. Nevertheless, the language I have quoted was
equally clear in rejecting the pretext-plus rule that would mandate entry of
judgment for a defendant in a pure pretext case. To the extent that the Court
changed anything about pretext law in Hicks, the five-member majority
reemphasized that the ultimate finding must be pretext for discrimination, and that
a mandatory finding for plaintiff after proof of pretext was incorrect. At best, I
would characterize the Hicks rule as "pretext-maybe." Most importantly, all nine
members of the Court acknowledged that pretext could, under ill-defined
circumstances, suffice to prove impermissible discrimination.
III. HICKS REVISITED-REEVES v. SANDERSON
It did not require great prescience to predict the result of Justice Scalia's
uncharacteristically permissive language in Hicks.'" The split among the circuits
that preexisted Hicks reemerged after 1993, much along the same lines as
before.'" Once again, a number of courts reintroduced the pretext-plus concept,
now relying on the phrase "suspicion of mendacity," to enter summary judgment
for defendants and even to overturn jury verdicts for plaintiffs in the absence of
"plus" evidence. Reeves may have been among the most egregious examples of
such activism, 9 but it did not stand alone. In Reeves, the Court ofAppeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed a jury finding for an ADEA plaintiff, on the grounds that
there was insufficient evidence that the pretextual reason concealed age
17. In light of the bitterness of the opinions in Hicks, I have often wondered whether the need to
obtain a fifth vote compelled Justice Scalia to include the permissive language quoted above. This
"pretext-maybe" loophole seems inconsistent with the majority opinion's open hostility to proving
discrimination by proving pretext. The majority opinion's liberal language is particularly puzzling in
light ofJustice Scalia's antipathy to circumstantial proof in employment discrimination cases, expressed
when he served on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Carter v. Duncan-
Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lanctot, The Defendant
Lies, supra note 5, at 96-98. It also seems inconsistent with Justice Scalia's often-stated preference for
bright-line rules. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175
(1 989); see also, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1569,1593
(1996) (noting inconsistency). I have argued elsewhere, however, that Justice Scalia's approach to
employment discrimination cases is not as predictable as one might expect from his conservative views.
See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Plain Meaning ofOncale, 7 Win. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 913
(1999).
18. See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, Pretext-Plus After Hicks: The Circuit Split Remains, in
1996 Wiley Employment Law Update 161-99 (H. Perritt, Jr., ed.) (1996).
19. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing and Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 La.
L. Rev. 575 (2001) ("The Fifth Circuit manipulated the conventional structure of individual disparate
treatment law to limit very stringently the scope of the law against discrimination.").
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discrimination. The court clearly relied on the pretext-plus rule, some version of
which had been articulated by that circuit as early as 1988.2"
Once again, in Reeves, the Supreme Court considered the effect of proof of
pretext in a disparate treatment case. Once again, the Court -held, this time
unanimously, that a plaintiff may prevail in such a case by proving pretext, without
additional evidence ofdiscrimination. Once again, the Court explained to the lower
courts why the pretext-plus rule was incorrect. After quoting the permissive
language from Hicks, Justice O'Connor explained:
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. In appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of
evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty
about a material fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt.' Moreover, once
the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well
be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer
is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Thus,
a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find
that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of
fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.2
The highlighted passage is virtually identical in meaning to the language in Burdine
that had supposedly been rejected by Hicks. Indeed, it seems eerily similar to the
permissive language included in the Hicks majority opinion. To the extent that
there is any difference between Hicks and Reeves, it is the omission of the concept
of "mendacity" as a consideration in determining whether or not the "pretext-
maybe" rule would be applied. A newcomer to the field might read this language
and reasonably believe that the Court finally has established a rule of law in
employment discrimination cases that will resolve the twenty-year circuit split over
pretext.
Reports of the death of the pretext-plus rule may be greatly exaggerated. In the
very next paragraph, Justice O'Connor carves out a cryptic loophole:
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be
adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be
instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no
rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For
instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if
20. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 72 n.48 (citing Bienkowski v. American
Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1988)).
21. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-48, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-
2109 (2000) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
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the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact
as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant
and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred.Y
The rule Reeves seems to set forth is less of a "pretext-maybe" approach, and
more of a "pretext-minus" rule. The lower courts must permit plaintiffs to
proceed by proving pretext by a preponderance of the evidence, but the presence
of "conclusively revealed" alternative explanations or "abundant and
uncontroverted" evidence will be subtracted from the weight of that proof to
result in a verdict for defendant. As if this unusual evidentiary standard were not
mysterious enough for litigants and the lower courts, Justice O'Connor further
muddies the waters in the next paragraph:
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular
case will depend on a number of factors. These include the strength of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the
employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the
employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. For purposes of this case, we need not-
and could not-resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors
would entitle an employer to judgment as a matter of law. 3
The Court reiterates that "[t]he ultimate question in every employment
discrimination case is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional
discrimination. '
Anyone who has examined the evolution of the pretext issue over time can
anticipate the confusion likely to be caused by the Court's waffling on this issue.
But only Justice Ginsburg, the well-known scholar in employment discrimination
law, calls attention to the dangers implicit in the Court's ambiguity. In her
concurrence, she notes that "it may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate
case, to define more precisely the circumstances in which plaintiffs will be
required to submit evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a
motion for judgment as a matter of law."' Describing such situations as likely
to be "uncommon" and "atypical," Justice Ginsburg explains that once pretext is
proven, "the inference [of discrimination] remains-unless it is conclusively
demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to credit on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, that discrimination could not have been the
defendant's true motivation."' 2
22. Id. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109 (emphasis supplied).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 153,120 S. Ct. at 2111.
25. Id. at 154, 120 S. Ct. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
26. Id.
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The long history of pretext litigation shows that courts will exploit any
loopholes provided by the Supreme Court to dismiss what they consider to be
unmeritorious discrimination suits. Not only does such judicial practice undermine
the purpose of the antidiscrimination laws, but it produces substantial injustice when
the standard of proof of claims under a federal statute varies so widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Will the Supreme Court have to confront the pretext
issue again, or has the "pretext-minus" rule provided sufficient guidance to the
lower courts to bring an end to a generation of uncertainty?
The preliminary results from the lower courts are not encouraging. As one
might predict, courts that remain uncomfortable with the concept of circumstantial
proof of employment discrimination are gravitating to Justice O'Connor's "pretext-
minus" language. Michael Zimmer has shown that the lower courts thus far have
not appreciably changed their basic approach to employment discrimination cases.27
The Fifth Circuit proved remarkably unrepentant, at least initially, after a
unanimous reversal by the Supreme Court.28 In addition, other courts are trying to
reinstate a new version of the pretext-plus rule by imposing more stringent
requirements for proving that the reason is pretext. 9 In short, it is business as usual
in the lower courts.3 One may confidently predict that some time in the next five
years or so, we scholars will be called upon again to dissect yet another attempt by
the Supreme Court to address the issue of pretext.
IV. PuTrING THE RULE BACK INTO "RULE OF LAW"-THE "PRETEXT-ALWAYS"
RULE
Why has this debate over pretext persisted so stubbornly? The antipathy of the
lower courts to circumstantial proof of disparate treatment claims may be explained
by many factors, including the ideological disposition of many lower court judges,
the societal changes in perception of the prevalence of discrimination, and a desire
to control the burgeoning dockets of the federal courts.3 But logically one would
have expected these very factors to influence the Supreme Court, with its deeply
conservative majority, to limit sharply the plaintiff's ability to win pretext cases.
Instead, as I have shown, the Court has steadfastly asserted for the last twenty years
that a plaintiff may prove a disparate treatment case by proving a prima facie case
and that the employer's reason was a pretext for discrimination. So why has this
deceptively simple rule proven to be so unworkable?
The simple answer is that this rule is not a rule. Neither the "pretext-maybe"
formulation in Hicks nor the "pretext-minus" articulation in Reeves qualifies as a
27. See Zimmer, supra note 19, at 582.
28. Id. at Section 11 (discussing Vadie v. Mississippi State Univ., 218 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2000);
Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2000); and Russell v.
McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2000)).
29. See Zimmer, supra note 19, at Section 11.
30. Id.
31. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 La.
L Rev. 555 (2001); Zimmer, supra note 19; Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 141.
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rule, as one commonly would understand the meaning of the term. A "rule," the
dictionary tells us, is "[a]n authoritative, prescribed direction for conduct, especially
one of the regulations governing procedure in a legislative body or a regulation
observed by the players in a game, sport, or contest." 32 The "pretext-plus"
formulation, for all its many defects, would at least qualify as a rule, in that the
litigants know that if the plaintiff cannot generate some additional evidence of
discrimination, the case will be lost. But neither Hicks nor Reeves establishes a rule
at all. Sometimes a plaintiff may win with pretext alone, andsometimes she may
lose, says the Court. It depends on the circumstances. This is hardly an
"authoritative, prescribed direction for conduct." It more closely resembles an
alternative definition for "rule," which is "[a] generalized statement that describes
what is true in most or all cases. '33 The lower courts have been permitted to
exercise virtually standardless discretion in individual discrimination cases.
Scholars have long debated whether a rules-based jurisprudence is preferable
to other regimes, and I will not revisit that question here. 34 Nevertheless, I would
suggest that the thirty-year struggle to develop coherent doctrine in garden-variety
employment discrimination cases ought to be examined closely by those who
advocate more flexibility for decision makers. It is particularly ironic that the
liberal preference for case-by-case exercises of discretion by judges has produced
a decidedly illiberal body of law in pretext cases. The failure to impose the rule of
law in these cases has enabled lower courts to interpose their own views of civil
rights for those embodied in federal law.3"
The only way to ensure the application of the rule of law in disparate treatment
cases is for the Supreme Court to actually impose one. In Hicks, the Court rejected
the "pretext-only" rule for fear that a defendant might lose a case even though there
was some secret nondiscriminatory reason that actually motivated its decision. In
Reeves, the Court has now unanimously rejected the "pretext-plus" rule. My
solution is for the Supreme Court to adopt a rule I will call the "pretext always"
rule, which is a modified version of the "pretext only" rule that the Court rejected
in Hicks. My rule would provide as follows:
A plaintiffin an individual disparate treatment case is entitled to judgment,
as a matter of law, if that plaintiff, by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Proves all the elements of the prima facie case, as set forth in
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny; and
2. Proves that the reason offered by the defendant was not the real
reason for the employment action; and
32. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1577 (3d ed. 1992).
33. Id. at definition 4.
34. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 17; Cass Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953
(1995).
35. See Susan Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 Ga.
L. Rev. 387, 421-24 (1996) (need to apply rules in disparate treatment cases to limit judicial bias).
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3. Proves that any other reason that reasonably may be inferred from
the evidence was not the real reason for the employment action.
Prior to the Court's ruling in Hicks, I argued for a pure pretext-only rule-that is,
once the plaintiff rebuts the defendant's articulated reason by a preponderance of
the evidence, such a showing mandates judgment for the plaintiff because the only
reason remaining in the case was the discriminatory one.36 I continue to believe that
this rule is the most fair to both plaintiffs and defendants in that it precludes
unwarranted speculation about "secret" nondiscriminatory reasons that the employer
did not articulate.37 Nevertheless, in light of the persistent concern about such
reasons expressed in Hicks, Reeves, and their progeny, I advance a rule that
responds to that issue.
The advantages of the pretext-always rule are many. First, as a matter of
substantive law, the rule crystallizes the teachings of the Court since McDonnell
Douglas, while closing down the principal loopholes that have emerged since
Burdine. Parts 1 and 2 of my rule simply reiterate the "pretext-maybe" language
of Hicks and Reeves, codifying existing case law. This should be unobjectionable,
except to those who reject the entire body of law developed since McDonnell
Douglas. My proposal admittedly assumes the continuing vitality of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie.case. In my view, that model is too fmnly entrenched in
employment law, as well as other areas of law, to be dismantled at this late date, and
no better alternative has yet been offered that would adequately protect the interests
of plaintiffs.3"
Part 3 of my rule removes the "maybe" from the Hicks formulation. It is
designed to address the situation that seems to haunt so many federal judges-the
specter of an undeserving plaintiffprevailing in an employment discrimination case
by showing pretext when the real reason being concealed by the employer was not
36. See Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 132-33.
37. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Can the Plaintiff Win If the Defendant Lies After Hicks?: The
Fallacy of the Pretext-Plus Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, in 1994 Wiley Employment
Law Update 106 (H. Perritt, ed.).
38. A full-blown defense of the prima facie case requirement established by McDonnell Douglas
is beyond the scope of this piece. I acknowledge that the McDonnell Douglas formulation of the prima
facie case has come under increasing attack in recent years. See, e.g., Malamud, The Last Minuet,
supra note 12. Nevertheless, it merits reiteration that this methodology not only pervades employment
discrimination law, but also has been imported into other areas, such as jury selection, Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). The reason for the widespread adoption of McDonnell
Douglas is that it provides a relatively straightforward rule for courts to apply in determining whether
a plaintiff has raised an inference of impermissible action by the defendant, by eliminating the most
common legitimate reasons for the adverse action. See generally Corbett, supra note 12. Unless we
are willing to take the draconian position that only plaintiffs with so-called "direct" evidence may
pursue discrimination claims, we will have to devise a way for such claims to be raised and proven
circumstantially. If McDonnell Douglas were to be scrapped by the Court tomorrow, or if Congress
were to amend the civil rights statutes to eliminate that methodology, the issue of proving cases without
direct evidence would still be with us. The elements of proof set forth in the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case may be imperfect, but it is difficult to see how it would be preferable to leave plaintiffs to the
mercy of trial courts and their individualized notions of what constitutes "discrimination."
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discrimination, but something else. I have argued previously that this solicitude for
employers who do not tell the truth in civil litigation is unwarranted,39 a position
also advanced by Justice Souter for the four dissenters in Hicks.'" Nevertheless,
the possibility that such an injustice might occur is so troubling to many courts that
it must be taken seriously if we ever hope to succeed in establishing the rule of law
in individual disparate treatment cases. Thus, my rule takes this concern into
account by imposing an additional burden on the pretext plaintiff. The plaintiff
must not only prove that the employer's articulated reason is untrue, but must also
be sure to rebut, by a preponderance of the evidence, any other reason presented by
the evidence that might serve as an alternative explanation for the adverse
employment action.4' If the plaintiff meets this additional burden, however, the
plaintiff has eliminated all reasons other than the discriminatory one, and is
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Closing the Loopholes in Reeves.
This formulation is justifiable on several counts. Although it seems on its
surface to add an additional step to the traditional pretext formulation, it is not a
significant leap when we recall that the concern about the alternative
nondiscriminatory reason is already part of many judges' analyses of disparate
treatment cases. Requiring the plaintiff to rebut a reason that the employer did not
bother to rely upon may seem unfair, but both Hicks and Reeves permit courts to
enter judgment for defendants when the plaintiff does not eliminate this possibility.
Limiting the plaintiff's obligation to rebutting reasons that have some evidentiary
basis is fair to both parties by eliminating the risk of speculation by the factfmder,
and facilitates review for sufficiency of the evidence on both pretrial and posttrial
motions.42
How would a "pretext-always" rule address Justice O'Connor's loophole in
Reeves? It eliminates the "instances where, although the plaintiff has established
39. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 133-36.
40. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,527,113 S. Ct. 2742, 2757 (1993) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
41. It should be noted that I do not characterize this requirement as a "legitimate"
nondiscriminatory reason. For reasons that I have explained in more detail elsewhere, I believe that the
term "legitimate" should more accurately be stated as "genuine." A so-called illegitimate reason may
be an unseemly reason Oike nepotism) or even an unlawful reason (like retaliating against a
whistleblower), but it is nevertheless not, absent unusual circumstances, a discriminatory reason under
federal law. See Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 136-40.
42. Common sense dictates that an employer does not offer a pretextual reason to conceal a
neutral or benign reason for its action. See Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 133. The
often-expressed notion that employers offer untrue justifications for their hiring decisions to spare the
feelings of employees by not pointing out their shortcomings simply does not hold up under scrutiny.
The economic consequences of an adverse ruling in an employment discrimination action alone would
stiffen the resolve of even the most tenderhearted employer. The notion seems particularly inconsistent
with the model of rational economic activity that animates so many conservative judges in other areas
of the law.
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a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's
explanation, no rational factfmder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory." '4 My rule responds directly to the hypothetical situation she
advances of a record that "conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employer's decision." Such a situation could not arise under my rule,
because the plaintiff is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
no such reason exists. Similarly, my rule addresses the other hypothetical situation
she posits, when "the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the
employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred."" The evidence would
no longer be "uncontroverted" under my formulation.45
My rule not only harmonizes existing inconsistencies in disparate treatment
law, but it provides certainty in an area where the exercise of virtually unfettered
judicial discretion has been especially unsettling. Despite the frequent cautionary
statements that employment discrimination law is to be treated like any other body
of law, it is difficult to imagine any other substantive area in which standardless
review of the evidence would be tolerated the way it is in pretext cases.
The "pretext-always" rule would also serve to clarify the blurring of questions
of fact and law that seems to underlie recent pretext cases. Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Reeves typifies the conflation of issues of law (whether proof of pretext
creates an inference of discrimination) with issues of the sufficiency of the evidence
(whether the evidence itself suffices to prove the substantive element at issue) and
issues of fact. Consider again the loophole created by the majority in Reeves for
pretext cases in which "the record conclusively revealed some other,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only
a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was
abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred."' This language can hardly be characterized as creating a limited
exception to a substantive rule of law. Rather, the language seems to speak to the
sufficiency of the evidence of pretext. Thus, this language is not inconsistent with
the "pretext-always" rule that I advocate.
Indeed, the loophole language in Reeves seems to be inconsistent with
traditional evidentiary burdens in civil cases. A plaintiff who proves that the
employer's reason is pretextual must by definition have proven that element by a
preponderance of the evidence-that is, that it is more likely than not that the reason
offered is untrue. It is difficult to see how that finding can coexist with a record that
43. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,148,120 S. Ct. 2097,2109 (2000).
44. Id. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
45. There are analytical weaknesses in the hypothetical examples pressed by the Reeves majority,
in that they seem to combine concerns about sufficiency of the evidence with concerns about the
substantive rule. It is difficult to understand how a plaintiffwho has proven pretext by a preponderance
of the evidence has made a "weak showing," or how in such a circumstance there would be "abundant
and uncontroverted" evidence to the contrary. Taking the opinion at face value, however, the "pretext
always" rule eliminates these concerns.
46. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
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"conclusively reveal[s]" some other nondiscriminatory reason. Presumably the
factfmder weighed the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and concluded, in
light of all factors, that the plaintiff's version of events was more likely than not the
real explanation for the adverse action. Similar difficulties arise with the concept
of "weak issue of fact." How lower courts are to apply this standard on summary
judgment, as well as in post trial motions, remains a mystery.47
In contrast, a "pretext-always" standard both responds to the Reeves concerns
while protecting the interests of defendants. Under my proposal, a plaintiff would
be required to disprove any nondiscriminatory reasons presented in the evidence in
order to prevail. This eliminates the possibility that the record will "conclusively
reveal" such reasons with "abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence."
If such reasons are so presented, they must be disproven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Once the plaintiff has done so, there are no other reasons fairly presented
by the evidence other than the discriminatory reason, and it is fair to enter judgment
for the plaintiff.
B. Secrets and Lies: Eliminating the Secret Nondiscriminatory Reason.
As a matter of logic, the "pretext-always" rule rejects the concept of the
employer who lies to conceal a "secret nondiscriminatory reason." The mythology
of the secret reason, neither raised by the employer nor reasonably inferred by the
evidence, has at times been advocated as an alternative source for entering judgment
for defendant. 4' Reeves seems to foreclose that possibility, and for good reason.
It is one thing to concede that an employer may prevail even if its proffered reason
is untrue, if there is sufficient evidence in the record for the factfmder to infer that
an alternative reason motivated the adverse action, and that evidence was not
successfully rebutted by the plaintiff. It is quite another to conclude that entry of
judgment for an employer would be permissible in the absence of any record
evidence of an alternative explanation, simply based on speculation by the
factfmnder.
For example, suppose the plaintiff in Reeves successfully showed, as he did,
that the employer's proffered reason for firing him (lateness and poor management)
was untrue. It would be unwarranted for the court to enter judgment for the
47. In particular, it is difficult to see howsummaryjudgment could be entered for defendant when
the record reveals a genuine factual dispute over the veracity of the employer's proffered explanation,
on the basis that the record "conclusively demonstrates" an alternative explanation. Under this scenario,
there are at least three possible explanations for the adverse employment action, all of which presumably
have record support: the plaintiff's explanation (illegal discrimination), the employer's explanation (the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason), and the alternative nondiscriminatory explanation. This is a
genuine factual dispute to be resolved by a jury, and the fact that there is strong record evidence that
the employer's proffered explanation is untrue would seem to bolster the plaintiff's case, not the
defendant's. What would constitute "conclusive" evidence on summary judgment, such that it would
not be subject to traditional concerns about credibility and cross-examination, is equally unclear. The
"pretext-always" rule would respond directly to this scenario by requiring the plaintiff to create a
genuine issue of fact with respect to other reasons lurking in the record.
48. See Lanctot, The Defendant Lies, supra note 5, at 132-35.
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defendant on the ground that the plaintiff might have had an undisclosed physical
altercation with his boss that caused the firing, if there was no evidence in the
record of such an event. Permitting that kind of speculation would result in the
evisceration of any rule of law in disparate treatment cases, and would render it
impossible to scrutinize a verdict for sufficiency of the evidence.49
Some may criticize my pretext-always rule because it is theoretically possible
that an undeserving plaintiff could win. A plaintiff could prevail by disproving
the employer's reasons and all other reasons, even though another
nondiscriminatory reason truly motivated the employer." We must remember that
the risk of error is present in all trials. Society tolerates such risk for a host of
other matters, particularly in civil trials where the evidentiary standard is
preponderance of the evidence, and even more particularly when proof is made
by circumstantial evidence.
The fact that critics of circumstantial proof in these cases are so obsessed
with the remote possibility of an occasional erroneous result is further evidence
of a societal reluctance to acknowledge the persistent problem of discrimination.
As the Supreme Court is fond of reminding us, employment discrimination cases
are just like other civil cases. The factfinder is dealing in probabilities. The
theoretical possibility that the occasional unmeritorious plaintiff might succeed
against a blameless employer has been driving the substantive debate for far too
long. Once all other reasonable probabilities raised by the circumstantial
evidence have been rebutted, the entry of judgment in plaintiff's favor is
warranted."
V. CONCLUSION
The pretext-always rule confronts the central meaning of the term "pretext"-
"something that is put forward to conceal a true purpose or object."'52 Once a
plaintiff has eliminated all other reasons in the record to explain the adverse
action, judgment should be entered on his or her behalf. Simply articulating this
simple rule would provide certainty in an area of law that desperately needs such
certainty. The framework under which litigants have labored for decades has not
produced consistent, fair results for either plaintiffs or defendants. It has left too
49. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the modem understanding that civil trials are no longer
"trial by ambush." See Leland Ware, Advocating Equality: Judge Theodore McMillan 's Civil Rights
Jurisprudence and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 43 St. Louis L.J. 1309, 1317-18 (1999).
50. This was the thrust of Justice Scalia's hypothetical in Hicks of the employer whose only
method of producing its legitimate reason would be through a disgruntled former employee and would
therefore lose the case unjustly.
51. As the Court said more than 20 years ago in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567,577,98 S. Ct. 2943,2950 (1978), "when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who
we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race."
52. Edwin Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and
Fabrications In The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 Ky. L J. 1, 19 (1990).
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much leeway for subjectivity and ideological predilection, and has not provided
adequate support for the salutary purposes of the federal antidiscrimination laws.
At a time when the entire structure of diiparate treatment claims is under
attack from both the Left and the Right, it may seem foolish to press for a rule that
not only recodifies traditional pretext analysis but also appears to limit the
discretion of federal judges in employment discrimination cases. Indeed, the
embrace ofrules has often been a hallmark of conservative jurisprudence. I admit
that mine may be a quixotic quest, but I believe that imposing the rule of law in
employment discrimination cases would achieve a progressive result. The civil
rights laws are just that-laws, not suggestions. My rule is designed to limit
judicial discretion, in an effort to establish the rule of law in disparate treatment
cases, in a way that is fair to both parties, and logically consistent with thirty
years of individual disparate treatment jurisprudence.

